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BREXIT: IS IT REALLY BREAKING FREE? THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE UK’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FIELD OF COMPETITION
Delphine Defossez ∗
Summary: Globalisation has not only increased international competi-
tion but also led to an increasingly more integrated and evolving legal 
system. On 23 June 2016, 52 percent of British voters opted to leave 
the European Union in the hope of ‘regaining their freedom’. The Unit-
ed Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has triggered an 
important political crisis at the same time as raising various questions 
as to the implications of such a withdrawal. This referendum leaves 
much uncertainty about the future in many areas, such as competi-
tion. Brexit raises particular problems for competition policy and law 
because of the infl uence of the European Commission in this fi eld. 
Indeed, the Commission is the major direct actor, while the nation-
al authorities mainly operate within the European framework. Many 
authors have argued that the implications of the UK’s withdrawal 
from the European Union depend on the type of agreement that is se-
cured by the UK. However, this article argues that whatever the type 
of agreement the UK strikes with the EU, EU competition law will still 
play a predominant role. 
1 Introduction 
Globalisation has not only increased international competition but 
has also led to an increasingly more integrated and evolving legal sys-
tem. The growing similarities between markets, distribution channels, 
and available infrastructure have enabled companies to sell products 
and brands all around the world. This facility of access and fl uidity of 
global capital markets has led to increasing vertical and horizontal inte-
gration and concentration.1
 The United Kingdom has been a member of the European Union 
(EU) since 1973. The UK’s dualist approach to international law and the 
constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty required the im-
∗  PhD candidate at the University of Brasilia (UnB), Brazil; LLM at European University 
Institute; LLM at Swansea University; LLB Maastricht University; https://orcid.org/0000-
0001-7285-0491. DOI: 10.3935/cyelp.14.2018.306 .
1 MR Czinkota, IA Ronkainen, MH Moffett and EO Moynihan, Global Business (3rd edn, 
South-Western College Publishers 2001).
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plementation of EU law into national law.2 Ever since then, EU law has 
been an integral part of the UK’s legal system, shaping its industry.3 As 
a Member State, the UK benefi ts from the facilities created by the inter-
nal market, such as people and companies being able to sell their goods, 
labour and services in the other Member States. Up until the referendum 
decision, the EU had only been expanding. However, on 23 June 2016, 
52 percent of British voters, ignoring the experts’ warnings of economic 
misery, opted to leave the Union in the hope of ‘regaining their free-
dom’.4 The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has 
triggered a signifi cant political crisis and, at the same time, has raised 
various questions as to the implications of such a withdrawal. This ref-
erendum leaves much uncertainty about the future in many areas, such 
as competition. 
 Brexit raises particular problems for competition policy and law 
because of the infl uence of the European Commission in this fi eld. In-
deed, the Commission is the major direct actor, while the national au-
thorities mainly operate within the European framework. 
 The implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union 
for competition policy depend on the type of agreement that is secured by 
the UK. Current UK competition rules are largely modelled on European 
rules. The UK will probably continue to rely on the Competition Act of 
1998 and the Enterprise Act of 2002, even after Brexit. The wish of the 
UK is to break free from its obligation of conforming with the EU system. 
Indeed, after Brexit, EU law will no longer be the superior norm and any 
decisions taken by the EU would no longer be binding upon the UK. At 
the same time, EU legislation implemented in UK law will still be applied, 
at least in the short-run, meaning that the UK will not be entirely freed 
from EU infl uence. 
Brexit raises many questions in the fi eld of competition policy, as 
the terms on which the UK would leave were not determined by the refer-
endum. A great uncertainty exists with regard to the exact relationship 
between the EU and the UK that will be implemented after Brexit. Such 
uncertainty only allows assumptions as to the implications of Brexit for 
EU and UK competition law. Both EU and UK competition policy and law 
2 Graham Gee and Alison L Young, ‘Brexit: Regaining Sovereignty?’ (2016) 22 European 
Public Law 131.
3 Arthur Flieger, ‘Newsletter − Flying into the Unknown: The UK’s Air Transport Relations 
with the European Union and Third Countries Following “Brexit” (Part 1)’ (Flieger Law 
Offi ce, 8 May 2018) <www.fl iegerlaw.com/en/newsletters/newsletter-fl ying-into-the-un-
known-the-uks-air-transport-relations-with-the-european-union-and-third-countries-fol-
lowing-brexit-part-1-2/> accessed 28 August 2018. 
4 Francesco Capriglione, ‘UK Referendum and Brexit Hypothesis: The Wayout Perspective 
and the Convenience to Remain United’ (2016) 27 European Business Law Review 887.
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enforcement refl ect a consensus that open and competitive markets are 
the way forward.5
This article critically discusses the implications of the UK’s with-
drawal from the European Union in the fi eld of competition policy, and 
demonstrates that EU competition law will continue to play an important 
role, independent of the type of agreement that is concluded between the 
EU and the UK. To show that EU law will still play a major role, this ar-
ticle will fi rst address the different possible scenarios for exit and then 
analyse the areas of state aid, antitrust policy and mergers. 
2 Brexit and the different possible scenarios
After the vote to leave, the UK Government tried to avoid trigger-
ing Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). However, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and UK courts have 
ruled that notifi cation under Article 50 cannot be revoked and that the 
question was not within the prerogative of the CJEU.6 The government 
triggered Article 50 in March 2017, which was, in the general opinion, 
considered too early due to the lack of a government plan for the future 
relationship. 
Article 50 TEU provides two options for withdrawal from the Union. 
In the fi rst case, withdrawal enters into force upon agreement. In the 
second, in the event no agreement is reached, the Member State has two 
years from the date of notifying the Council.7 The withdrawal agreement 
must be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).8 Interestingly, no timing 
is given in the Treaty for submitting the notifi cation of exit, but the UK 
Government has been pressured by both the EU institutions and other 
Member States to start the procedure for exit to minimise the period of 
instability.9
The nature of the implications of Brexit will depend on the agree-
ment reached between the UK and the EU. This agreement will embody 
5 John Vickers, ‘Consequences of Brexit for Competition Law and Policy’ (2017) 33 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 70.
6 Steve Peers, ‘Brexit: Can the ECJ Get Involved?’ (EU Law Analysis, 3 November 2016) 
available at <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.br/2016/11/brexit-can-ecj-get-involved.
html> accessed 24 May 2018. 
7 Art 50(2) and (3) of the Treaty on European Union. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C326, 26 
Oct 2012, 1-390.
8 Article 50(2) TEU. 
9 Paolo R Vergano and Tobias Dolle, ‘The Trade Law Consequences of Brexit’ (2016) 7 Eu-
ropean Journal of Risk Regulation 795. 
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a model for future relations between the two. Moreover, the terms of 
any such agreement will need to be approved by the UK Parliament, 
the Council and the European Parliament.10 In theory, there are several 
alternative scenarios that could arise following the UK’s departure from 
the EU. As the UK Government pointed out in a report of the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: ‘In Europe’s current institutional 
architecture, any decision as to whether the UK should remain in the EU 
would to a signifi cant extent be a decision about whether the UK should 
remain in the Single Market’.11
2.1 Scenario 1: bilateral agreements 
Without access to the internal market, the UK would need to enter 
into a series of bilateral agreements to have access to the internal market 
under certain conditions, which is often referred to as the Swiss Model.12 
The extent of such access to the internal market would depend on the 
UK’s willingness to continue applying certain elements of EU law.13 How-
ever, even in the Swiss example, close cooperation between competition 
authorities is required, and to this effect, Switzerland signed an agree-
ment with the EU in 2014.14 Although this option would enable the UK to 
keep its sovereignty, it also provides a framework for coordination in the 
enforcement of competition, and requires a strengthening of cooperation 
in the fi ght against breach of competition law.15 Moreover, it is probable 
that industry would put pressure on the UK government to continue ap-
plying EU competition law, as the one-stop shop in merger control brings 
signifi cant benefi ts to business. Additionally, British companies might 
encounter diffi culties in gaining access to the internal market, as reg-
ulatory barriers could limit attractive tariff treatment.16 The UK would 
10 P Bowers, A Lang, V Miller, B Smith and D Webb, ‘Brexit: Some Legal and Constitution-
al Issues and Alternatives to EU Membership’, House of Commons Library Briefi ng Paper 
07214, 2016, 6; Richard Craig, ‘UK: The Potential Impact of Brexit on UK Competition Law’ 
(Mondaq, 7 June 2016) <www.mondaq.com/uk/x/498222/Trade+Regulation+Practices/
The+Potential+Impact+Of+Brexit+On+UK+Competition+Law> accessed 24 May 2018.
11 House of Commons Library, ‘Leaving the EU’ (Research Paper 13/42, 2013) <http://
researchbriefi ngs.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefi ng/Summary/RP13-42> accessed 24 May 
2017. 
12 Ali Nikpay, ‘Now What? Competition Law Post-Brexit’ [2016] CPI Journal <www.com-
petitionpolicyinternational.com/now-what-competition-law-post-brexit/> accessed 23 May 
2018. 
13 Global Counsel, ‘Brexit: The Impact on the UK and the EU’ (June 2015) <www.glob-
al-counsel.co.uk/sites/default/fi les/special-reports/downloads/Global%20Counsel_Im-
pact_of_Brexit.pdf> accessed 23 May 2018. 
14 Ovidiu-Horia Maican, ‘Legal Aspects of Brexit’ (2016) 6 Juridical Tribune 252.
15 Nikpay (n 12). 
16 Vergano and Dolle (n 9).
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probably be required to apply EU regulations to benefi t from full access 
to the internal market. As Paolo R Vergano and Tobias Dolle have noted, 
‘This requirement would de facto limit British sovereignty’.17
To avoid British goods having to be tested twice on safety, health 
and environmental compliance, an agreement would be necessary be-
tween the EU and the UK. Mechanisms to guarantee mutual recognition 
would, therefore, need to be negotiated. Thus, the freedom that the UK 
was aspiring to fi nd would not exist with this option, as the situation 
would pretty much remain the same as before the UK’s exit. 
The UK could adopt a position identical to the EU-Turkey agree-
ment.18 This regime would not guarantee automatic access to the in-
ternal market and would only mean that the external tariffs of the UK 
would be aligned with EU tariffs. Under this approach, the UK would 
lose control over the applicable tariff but would be able to enter into FTAs 
with third countries. It would also be able to adopt its own trade defence 
measures, even against the EU. UK companies would still be subject to 
EU product standards, however, and in the case of non-compliance, the 
EU could introduce anti-dumping duties or even suspend the import of 
UK goods. 
Finally, the UK could enter into a ‘Deep and Comprehensive FTA’, 
similar to the agreements the EU has with Ukraine or Canada. This type 
of agreement removes customs duties and restrictions on public pro-
curement and services. It also safeguards intellectual property rights, 
environmental standards for food safety, workers’ protection and techni-
cal regulations. Although the UK would not be represented in EU insti-
tutions, a forum would be in place to ensure negotiation and discussion. 
‘With respect to non-tariff barriers on trade in goods, the agreement 
would apply WTO principles such as national treatment and the prohibi-
tion of import and export restrictions’.19 This approach would not oblige 
the UK to make any concession on the free movement of persons. 
2.2 Scenario 2: retaining access through an EEA 
Another option could be that the British government and the EU 
sign a European Economic Area Agreement (EEA). This creates a homo-
geneous and dynamic agreement, based on equal conditions and com-
mon rules of competition.20 Moreover − and unlike EFTA, which only al-
17 Vergano and Dolle (n 9).
18 Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on implementing the fi nal phase of 
the Customs Union (96/142/EC) 22 December 1995.
19 Vergano and Dolle (n 9) 797.
20 Maican (n 14).
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lows free trade with the EU on non-agricultural goods − the EEA enables 
contracting parties to benefi t from the four freedoms: goods, persons, 
services and capital. The so-called Norway Model provides horizontal 
provisions relevant to the four freedoms, such as consumer protection.21 
The EEA agreement also means that two legal systems are appli-
cable in parallel. In the case of trade with EU Member States, UK com-
mon law rules would apply, while for mergers, the European Commission 
would have exclusive jurisdiction.22 The exclusive jurisdiction of the Com-
mission means that the one-stop shop for merger control would remain, 
which is one of the major advantages of this option. This route might be 
simpler, but it is not straightforward. Indeed, to have EEA membership, 
the country must fi rst be part of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). 
Joining the EEA would not have a major impact on competition pol-
icy in the UK.23 Competition is unlikely to be modifi ed in the fi eld of 
competition and state aid, at least in the short to medium-term. The UK 
would be required to adopt the competition rules of the EEA Agreement, 
which is identical in substance to EU rules.24 However, the EEA Agree-
ment does not cover a customs union or common trade policy. Therefore, 
much of the existing body of EU law would still apply, but it would allow 
the UK to apply its own external tariffs towards third parties. The EEA 
Agreement also contains prohibitions on abuse of a dominant market 
position which are similar to EU prohibitions.25 The courts of EEA mem-
bers are also required to interpret EEA provisions in accordance with the 
decisions of the European courts. 
The major disadvantage of this option is that the UK would no longer 
be able to infl uence the future developments of EU competition law direct-
ly.26 Such an impossibility might have implications over the long-term, 
especially since over the last 20 years the UK has been ‘the strongest 
proponent of competition interventions’, focusing exclusively on consum-
21 Vergano and Dolle (n 9).
22 Georgios Petropoulos, ‘Brexit and Competition Policy in Europe’ (Breugel, 6 July 2016) 
<http://bruegel.org/2016/07/brexit-and-competition-policy-in-europe/> accessed 23 May 
2018.
23 Petropoulos (n 22). 
24 Jay Modrall and others, ‘Antitrust and Competition’ (Norton Rose Fulbright, July 2018) 
<www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/136988/antitrust-and-competi-
tion> accessed 28 August 2018.
25 Craig (n 10).
26 Sir Philip Lowe, ‘The Implications of Brexit for UK and EU Competition Policy and Law 
Enforcement: Response to BCLWG October 2016 Issues Paper’ (Brexit Competition Law 
Working Group, 22 November 2016) <www.bclwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Re-
sponse-to-BCLWG-Issues-Paper-PL161116.pdf> accessed 23 May 2018).
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er welfare.27 Without this direct ability to infl uence future developments, 
EU competition law might give more weight to other public policy inter-
ests, such as national champions or employment. Such a possibility has 
been reinforced by the position of François Hollande, the former French 
president, who, a few days after the referendum, was talking about the 
adaptation of competition law after Brexit to ensure greater support for 
growth, employment, and investments.28 The UK has mainly been a keen 
protector of the EU state aid framework and opposed to national cham-
pions which demonstrate a more protectionist approach to competition. 
On top of this, the case law of the CJEU applies to the fi eld covered by 
the EEA Agreement. This means that the UK would need to comply with 
EU law without any possibility of voting on such laws. 
This option will probably not be chosen after the Prime Minister’s 
speech on 17 January 2017, when it was announced that the UK govern-
ment was not seeking membership of the single market but was seek-
ing a close trading relationship with the EU through a free trade agree-
ment.29 This option was rejected by the Prime Minister because EEA 
membership defeated the purpose of Brexit, as under this alternative the 
UK would remain under obligations to apply EU competition law. How-
ever, the House of Lords voted for an amendment to the government’s 
Brexit bill which could mean that the UK will adopted this position. The 
rejection of this model was also motivated by that fact that the relation-
ship between the CMA and the EFTA Surveillance Authority would be 
quasi-equivalent to the existing relationship between the CMA and the 
Commission. 
As the government’s impact assessment has highlighted, this option 
would result in the smallest damage in terms of the economy.30 This 
scenario would allow the UK to retain full access to the single market 
without the obligation to sign up for other EU programmes, such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Although the UK would be freed from CJEU 
jurisdiction, while still required to obey its case law, it would be subject 
to the EFTA court, which would represent another set of interfering for-
eign judges.31 The greater disadvantage would be that the UK would no 
longer be able to shape the rules of the single market. The Norway Model 
27 Nikpay (n 12).
28 Nikpay (n 12). 
29 Peter Willis and Richard Eccles, ‘Brexit: Competition Law Implications’ (Bird & Bird, 26 
January 2017) <www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/competition-law-implica-
tions-of-a-brexit> accessed 23 May 2018.
30 Adam Payne, ‘The House of Lords Voted for Theresa May to Negotiate a Norway-style 
Brexit: Here’s What that Means’ (Business Insider, 9 May 2018) <www.businessinsider.
com/what-is-the-norway-model-brexit-2018-4> accessed 28 August 2018. 
31 Payne (n 30).
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is more constraining than the Swiss model, with Norway having signed a 
wide range of arrangements which cover a broader realm of issues than 
the ones regulated under the EEA agreement. 
2.3 Scenario 3: no access to the internal market 
The third option is a full exit from the EU without any agreement in 
place. This would dramatically change the manner in which competition 
law is applied. At the very beginning of the Brexit negotiations, various 
EU leaders were resolved to make an example of Brexit by forcing the UK 
to exit from both the single market and the customs union to show that 
European integration is an irreversible process.32 Indeed, these leaders 
know that the Union has less to lose than the UK, as 48% of British ex-
ports go to EU countries, compared to 8% of the EU’s exports which head 
to the UK.33 After the fi rst shock of the triggering of Article 50, the EU 
has demonstrated its willingness to let the UK stay in the single market 
and customs union if it so wishes, while the UK government was the one 
insisting on an extreme version of Brexit. One of the possible negative 
outcomes for the UK is that in its future trade and investment negotia-
tions, it will face less favourable terms.34 
The picture, however, is not all black and white. Indeed, UK competi-
tion law is modelled on the EU system. While Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
will no longer directly apply to the UK, it is likely that EU case law would 
continue to have a strong infl uence on the way competition law is applied 
in the UK. At the same time, other provisions would no longer be of any 
use, such as Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, the provision preventing 
national law from prohibiting conduct that is permitted under EU law. 
The 1998 Competition Act will need to be amended. For instance, 
section 60 − which requires the CMA and UK courts to follow EU law 
− will be abolished. However, other sections are likely to be maintained 
and copied into domestic law. For example, Section 10, referring to agree-
ments now falling under the EU Block Exemption Regulation and au-
tomatically exempted under UK competition law, will no longer be re-
quired. Nevertheless, the provisions of the EU Block Exemption Regula-
tion, which are regarded by business and practitioners as benefi cial, will 
need to be kept. It is likely that the provisions will be transcribed into 
UK law.
32 Matthias Matthijs, ‘Europe After Brexit: A Less Perfect Union’ (2017) 96 Foreign Affairs 
85.
33 Matthijs (n 32); House of Commons Library, ‘Brexit: Impact Across Policy Areas’ (House 
of Commons Library Briefi ng Paper No 07213, 26 August 2016) <http://researchbriefi ngs.
parliament.uk/ResearchBriefi ng/Summary/CBP-7213> accessed 23 May 2018.
34 Matthijs (n 32); House of Commons Library (n 33). 
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Merger and antitrust investigations would fall within the competen-
cies of the UK and no longer under the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU, 
since the EU would no longer be responsible for ensuring the effective 
operation of competition in the UK. This, in turn, would increase the 
regulatory costs of business for the UK. Moreover, ‘UK lawyers are likely 
to lose rights of audience before the European courts, and UK lawyers’ 
advice may lose attracting legal privilege in EU proceedings’.35 Such ad-
vice would no longer be legally privileged in competition cases before the 
Commission and the Court of Justice.36 London is also an important 
centre for international litigation for damages actions in competition cas-
es.37 Following Brexit and without any agreements, Brussels I and Rome 
II Regulations will no longer apply, signifi cantly reducing the benefi ts of 
bringing damages actions in competition cases in London. 
Under this situation, the UK could seek to rely on its membership 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a basis for regulating trade 
between the EU and itself.38 This means that the UK would not have 
preferential market access to the EU internal market and would not be 
subject to the EU’s common external tariff. Neither would it be subject to 
the case law of the CJEU. In addition, the UK would not be able to benefi t 
from the FTAs negotiated by the EU and would be obliged to negotiate 
new ones on its own. The UK would regain absolute customs sovereign-
ty and adopt its own external tariffs, valuations or classifi cations. UK 
goods would, however, be subject to the EU external tariffs, as both enti-
ties would be able to adopt their own trade defence measures.
3  Brexit: is it really breaking free? 
Due to the strong trade between the UK and the EU, UK companies 
will not be able to escape entirely from EU regulations. Indeed, to oper-
ate within the internal market, companies will have to comply with EU 
standards and legislation such as REACH.39
35 John Schmidt, ‘Leave or Remain? What the EU Referendum Means for Competition Law-
yers’ in Ann-Marie Day and others, Continental Shift: Brexit & the Law (LexisNexis 2015) 16.
36 Payne (n 30).
37 Payne (n 30).
38 Payne (n 30).
39 Piet Eeckhout, ‘Brexit is not an Escape from EU Regulation’, (UCL European Institute, 
18 February 2016) <www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/analysis/2015-16/eu-regula-
tion-brexit> accessed 23 May 2018; Stephen Booth and others, ‘What if...? The Conse-
quences, Challenges & Opportunities Facing Britain outside EU’ (Open Europe, March 
2015) <http://europas-krisen.zdf.de/media/downloads/Brexit/150507-Open-Europe-
What-If-Report-Final-Digital-Copy.pdf> accessed 23 May 2018.
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Competition policy in both the UK and EU refl ects a solid interna-
tional consensus that competitive and open markets are the most ade-
quate manner of serving consumers.40
3.1 State aid 
State aid refers to any form of advantages conferred to undertak-
ings by national authorities on a selective basis which is incompatible 
with the internal market.41 State aid rules were enacted to control the 
support that a company can receive from its government, as this ad-
vances the company over its competitors.42 Therefore, the EU decided to 
include provisions within the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) − Articles 107 to 109 − that prohibit state aid ‘unless it is 
justifi ed by reasons of general economic development’.43 Provisions on 
state aid have been in place since the Treaty of Rome, but their content 
has evolved over time.44 These changes have been realised through the 
amendment of Treaty rules, as well as the enactment of many secondary 
measures and guidelines, some of which apply to specifi c sectors, while 
others apply in a horizontal manner.45 Prohibition is not absolute, as in 
some cases state aid is necessary and fair, but the rules are quite strict.46
With a view to ensuring harmonisation, the control of state aid has 
been delegated to the European Commission. The Commission plays a 
key role in reviewing aid and deciding whether to alter it or not. The 
Council, in exceptional circumstances, may block the actions of the 
Commission by deciding that the aid is compatible with the internal 
40 Lowe (n 26). 
41 A broad interpretation has been given to ‘aid’, to cover all types of transfer of state re-
sources and other economic advantages, including tax exemptions that have an actual or 
potential effect on trade between Member States. The de minimis rule again applies. Vincent 
Verouden, ‘EU State Aid Control: The Quest for Effectiveness’ (2015) 4 European State Aid 
Law Quarterly 459.
42 Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and James Flynn, The Law of State Aid in the European 
Union (OUP 2004); European Commission, ‘State Aid Control’ <http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html> accessed 23 May 2018. 
43 European Commission (n 42).
44 Leigh Hancher, Tom Ottervanger and Pieter J Slot, EU State Aids (Sweet & Maxwell 
2012); Wolfgang Mederer, Nicola Pesaresi and Marc Van Hoof, EU Competition Law: State 
Aid (Claeys & Casteels 2008).
45 Individual sectors include: audio-visual productions, broadcasting, electricity, motor ve-
hicles, transport, etc. Horizontal measures are: regional aid, environmental aid, training 
aid, risk capital aid, etc. See: Herwig CH Hofmann and Claire Micheau, State Aid Law of the 
European Union (OUP 2016). 
46 Jeremy Lever, ‘EU State Aid Law: Not a Pretty Sight’ (2013) 1 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 5.
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market. The EU courts play an important role in the area of state aid.47 
The General Court is responsible for deciding on direct actions brought 
by legal or natural persons against the acts of the Commission or other 
EU institutions.48 It also hears complaints about failures to act and reg-
ulatory acts, as well as actions brought by Member States against the 
Commission or Council relating to state aid. The Court of Justice hears 
appeals from the General Court.49 
Rules prohibiting Member States from distorting competition by 
granting aid to specifi c businesses, which has virtually no equivalent in 
UK competition law, might be abolished depending on the type of Brexit 
that is negotiated.50 If the UK remains inside the European Economic 
Area (EEA), the status quo will prevail.51 However, if the UK goes for a 
hard Brexit, the UK would be outside the staid aid control system but 
would be far from being free, as WTO rules would still apply, since ‘virtu-
ally no UK-made rules exist at present’.52 In theory, the UK would, there-
fore, have a greater scope for engaging in new industrial strategies by, for 
instance, giving preferential treatment to UK businesses and subsidising 
national champions. However, such an approach could have counterpro-
ductive effects, since companies in the EU might seek to take punitive 
measures. In practice, however, it seems that it is not EU rules that have 
curtailed the government’s ability to grant state aid but rather ‘the fail-
ure of the UK Government to exploit the present rules to the full’.53
47 Cormac Little and Claire Waterson, ‘The EU State Aid Regime: An Overview’ (William Fry 
2014) <www.williamfry.com/docs/default-source/2015-pdf/the-eu-state-aid-regime-an-
overview.pdf?sfvrsn=0> accessed 28 August 2018.
48 Little and Waterson (n 47).
49 Hofmann and Micheau (n 45); John Temple Lang, ‘EU State Aid Rules: The Need for Sub-
stantive Reform’ (2014) 13(3) European State Aid Law Quarterly 440.
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2017) <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedoc-
ument/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/brexit-competition/written/69966.html> ac-
cessed 8 August 2018; Willis and Eccles (n 29).
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Annual Lecture of the Centre for European Law, King’s College, London, 13 October 2016) 
<www.kcl.ac.uk/law/tli/about/Baudenbacher-Kings-College-13-10-16.pdf> accessed 28 
August 2018.
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brexit-competition/oral/71892.html> accessed 8 August 2018; HM Government, ‘Review of 
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Additionally, the UK will lose infl uence on the state aid decisions im-
plemented in the EU, which might advantage fi rms that are also trading 
in the UK market.54 If the UK opts for a trade agreement with the EU, the 
implications are somewhat less clear. Indeed, in the agreement between 
Canada and the EU, no provisions on state aid were included, while in 
the agreement between Ukraine and the EU, Ukraine was required to 
implement EU rules.55
It is the UK government that will take the fi nal decision as to whether 
to replace the system with a domestic one or not. Nevertheless, it seems 
quite likely that the EU would insist on a continuation of the equivalent 
of EEA rules.56 A possible solution would be to develop coordination to 
avoid state aid policies which could distort competition while maintain-
ing a level playing fi eld. This solution would also restrict the possibility 
of the EU authorities limiting market access to UK companies that have 
received signifi cant state aid. As already proposed, the CMA could play 
the role of ensuring compliance with state aid rules. In any event, the 
WTO anti-subsidy rules would still be applicable and would, therefore, 
restore part of the EU state aid rules.57 
3.2 Antitrust
The increase in international trade has been promoted by govern-
ments and ensured through a set of rules especially developed to in-
crease competitiveness. As a result, antitrust laws have been enacted 
to promote competition and prohibit market concentration in which a 
monopoly would emerge.
EU competition law is rooted in the Treaty of Rome of 1958.58 Unlike 
antitrust law in the US, in Europe, the focus has been on preventing 
abuses of dominant market positions and not preventing structural con-
centrations of economic power. European policymakers understood the 
advantages that market concentration creates, and that such concen-
54 Georgios Petropoulos (n 22).
55 Nicholas Crafts, ‘Brexit and State Aid’ (2017) 33 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 105, 
106.
56 G Peretz, and K Bacon, ‘Paper on Post-Brexit Options for State Aid’ (UK State Aid Law As-
sociation 2016) <http://uksala.org/paper-on-post-brexit-options-for-state-aid/> accessed 
8 August 2018.
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Studies on Exclusionary Conduct and State Aid (Kluwer Law International 2011); Kiran 
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tration is not dangerous per se.59 The abuse of such concentration does, 
however, interfere with the internal market.60 Since the cornerstone idea 
of the European Union is the internal market, the Union is keen on leg-
islating whenever, in its opinion, certain conduct could have a hindering 
effect on it, especially as the Union has the powers under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU. 
The main legislation in the UK dealing with antitrust matters is the 
Competition Act of 1998 which brought UK law into line with EU law. 
The prohibitions of anti-competitive agreements found in Chapter I of 
the 1998 Act, and of abuse of dominance, found in Chapter II, mirror the 
prohibitions in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Consequently, in all of the 
scenarios mentioned above, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU will continue to 
apply post-Brexit both directly to any conduct or agreements by UK busi-
nesses having an effect within the EU, and indirectly through reliance 
on the provision of the Competition Act. On top of this, CJEU judgments 
might still be referred to as benchmarks for the interpretation of the pro-
visions in Chapters I and II of the Competition Act of 1998, as was the 
case in Allianz.61
Similar to the agreements and conduct of Asian or US companies 
having an impact on EU markets, a UK business will continue to face 
investigation and fi nes by the EU Commission if its conduct affects the 
internal market. This situation is similar to what happened before Brex-
it, with the exception that the Commission will no longer be able to carry 
out on-site investigations in the UK or ask the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) to do so on its behalf.62 The Commission’s power will 
be limited to making written requests for information, as it already does 
with businesses based outside the EU.63
The effects of Brexit will mainly be felt in relation to the enforce-
ment of competition law by the UK authorities.64 The pre-Brexit era was 
highlighted by either the Commission or the CMA claiming exclusive 
jurisdiction over anti-competitive investigations. The Commission in-
vestigated anti-competitive behaviours which affected trade between 
59 Sinisa Varga, ‘Abuse of a Dominant Market Position in the Frames of the EU Antitrust 
Law’ (2006) 8 Review of European Law 5.
60 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP 
2016). 
61 Case C-23/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt and others v Gazdasági Versenyhivatal 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:160.
62 Willis and Eccles (n 29).
63 Willis and Eccles (n 29).
64 R Gordon and R Moffatt, ‘Brexit: The Immediate Legal Consequences’ (Report of the Con-
stitution Society, 2016) <www.consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Brexit-PDF.
pdf> accessed 23 May 2018. 
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Member States, while the CMA only investigated behaviour with an ef-
fect restricted to the UK. In the fi rst two scenarios, the enforcement of 
competition law will not greatly change. However, without agreement, 
enforcement will be left to the national authority to decide. Due to the 
role of section 60 of the Competition Act of 1998, even if the section is 
removed, the impact of it will still be felt. Indeed, the CMA will look at the 
signifi cant body of case law, which was developed in line with EU law. 
EU competition case law will, at least at the beginning, remain infl uen-
tial, even without an express statutory link, due to the similarity of the 
provisions.65 One major problem will be that if the UK opts for one of the 
two fi rst scenarios, since it will no longer have the facility of referring 
questions for interpretation to the European Court of Justice, it might 
gradually lead to divergence. The same will be true if the UK does not 
obtain any agreement. 
Moreover, the workload of the CMA will increase, as under EU law 
national authorities are required to set aside their investigations when 
the Commission opens a formal investigation.66 The risk of parallel in-
vestigations will therefore increase. In the post-Brexit era, it will be pos-
sible to have an EU cartel investigation running parallel with a UK in-
vestigation. Such a possibility endangers business effi ciency. On top of 
that, certain procedural interactions will no longer apply.67 For instance, 
in the pre-Brexit era, cartel members could safeguard their position in 
the national queues for leniency through a submission of a short form 
application to the national authority and a full application to the EU 
authorities. 
Section 10 of the 1998 Competition Act will need to be redefi ned by 
the government, which may seize the opportunity to enact new exemp-
tions without a strong focus on the single market, as is the case now.68 
For instance, the government could decide to permit a greater degree of 
territorial restriction. Due to the strong consensus among businesses 
and practitioners that the Block Exemption Regulation is benefi cial to 
business, it is likely that the UK will keep the provisions but amend them 
slightly to refl ect the focus of the government. 
Directive 2014/104 on antitrust damages actions has not been 
transposed into UK law and never will be, especially in the case of a hard 
Brexit. As a result, the UK might become the preferred jurisdiction for 
bringing competition law damages actions because of the broad disclo-
65 Willis and Eccles (n 29).
66 Lowe (n 26).
67 Willis and Eccles (n 29).
68 Lowe (n 26).
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sure available.69 In both the Directive and the case law, protection from 
disclosure of certain documents is provided, including any applications 
of the defendant for leniency to competition law regulators.70 In light of 
these facts, the UK might become an attractive jurisdiction for claim-
ants but only for companies that are not close to the EU. Indeed, with 
the decisions of EU institutions no longer binding upon UK courts, any 
competition judgments will be of no help to the company, as many claims 
require an infringement decision by the Commission as a proof of the 
breach, which eliminates a substantial evidential burden for claimants: 
‘The English court could also bring claims to trial more quickly, without 
waiting years for the fi nal determination of the cartelists’ appeals to the 
European courts.’71
The close coordination between the Commission and national com-
petition authorities will be weakened by Brexit. Some of the advantages 
that the UK had will be lost, which worries airline companies. For in-
stance, almost every area of air transport is affected, from access to the 
internal aviation market to air traffi c management. The future of the 
UK’s air transport relations will depend on the partnership it obtains 
with the European Union. Indeed, Ryanair, British Airways, and EasyJet 
might no longer be considered as community air carriers for the purpose 
of EU Regulation 1008/2008, falling outside of the scope of nearly all the 
agreements on aviation. This means that these companies will no longer 
enjoy the competitive advantages that they had up until Brexit, as they 
will have to comply with two sets of competition rules. These companies 
will have to relocate their headquarters or sell off a large number of 
shares to European nationals to avoid losing some major routes within 
the EU. Moreover, if no agreement is put in place, old bilateral air service 
agreements will become effective again.72 Such agreements will render 
UK companies less competitive, as they will set capacity requirements, 
days, the carrier that can operate routes, etc.73 EU competition law en-
sured fair competition in the liberalised market.74 
69 Craig (n 10).
70 Craig (n 10).
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72 B Havel, Beyond Open Skies: A New Regime for International Aviation (Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2009) 306.
73 PPC Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Ap-
proach (Kluwer Law International 2003) 114-115.
74 Civil Aviation Authority, Economic Regulation Group, ‘Ownership and Control Liberalisa-
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As suggested by Dr Matthew Cole, a solution would be for the UK to 
continue to apply antitrust law in the same way but in a ‘voluntary’ and 
‘non-binding’ manner, allowing courts to develop the law while avoiding 
departure from the EU system and further burdening companies.75
3.3 Mergers 
‘As such, mergers and acquisitions are used not only as a means to 
achieve market penetration in international markets, but also to achieve 
greater economies of scope and scale to serve a global customer base more 
effi ciently’.76 Mergers and acquisitions allow expansion without having 
to duplicate infrastructure. Currently, nearly every major industry has 
been consolidated through mergers, such as telecommunications, avi-
ation or fi nancial services. At the same time, mergers and acquisitions 
remove certain competitors, which can harm the competitive structure 
of the industry. Moreover, mergers always involve large amounts of mon-
ey. For this reason, mergers should be controlled to avoid one company 
owning the market and establishing a monopolistic power. Monopolistic 
powers enable fi rms to restrict output.
The majority of jurisdictions require notice of merger. Even though 
some international organisations have established some level of harmon-
isation, important discrepancies remain between merger fi ling regimes.77 
Surprisingly, no provisions specifi cally dealing with mergers can be 
found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) it-
self or the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This is because mergers 
were viewed as a legitimate tool to achieve economic effi ciency through 
economies of scale.78 In other words, mergers per se are not problematic. 
However, when a merger disrupts the internal market, then it is prohib-
ited, as it infringes the prohibition on cartels or abuse of a dominant 
position in Articles 101, 102, 103 and 106 TFEU. Merger control has a 
similar role to Article 102 TFEU, but it restricts abuse before concentra-
tions arise. It is an ex-ante prevention of creating dominant fi rms. The 
preventive effect was recognised in Gencor Ltd v Commission,79 when the 
75 Dr Matthew Cole, ‘Written Evidence (CMP0040)’ <http://data.parliament.uk/written-
evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/
brexit-competition/written/70984.html> accessed 8 August 2018.
76 KJ Hamner, ‘The Globalization of Law: International Merger Control and Competition 
Law in the United States, The European Union, Latin America and China’ (2002) 11 J 
Transnational Law & Policy 385, 388.
77 François Lévêque and Howard A Shelanski, Merger Remedies in American and European 
Union Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2003). 
78 Catalin Stefan Rusu, European Merger Control: The Challenges Raised by Twenty Years 
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Court of First Instance described merger control as being there ‘to avoid 
the establishment of market structures which may create or strengthen 
a dominant position and not … to control directly possible abuses of 
dominant positions’. Even so, the regulation of mergers and acquisitions 
was enacted through secondary legislation, especially the Merger Reg-
ulation and the Notices issued by the Commission explaining various 
aspects of the Merger Regulation.80
The fi rst merger regulation was adopted in 1989 and was replaced 
by the Merger Regulation of 2004, which is based on Article 103 TFEU. 
The fi rst step towards harmonisation was through Council Regulation 
1/2003. The Union wanted to place national courts and national com-
petition authorities at the heart of the procedure under Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.81 A direct consequence of this EU regulation is that a wide 
range of mergers involving UK companies falls within the scope of EU 
merger control rules.82 
‘The Merger Regulation lays down the conditions under which the 
European Commission or the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) 
have jurisdiction.’83 Concentrations with an EU dimension are investigat-
ed by the Commission, as it has exclusive jurisdiction, whereas national 
mergers fall under the jurisdiction of the NCAs according to national 
merger control rules. The Merger Regulation kept the original thresh-
olds from the 1989 Regulation requiring the prior approval of the Com-
mission specifi cally for cross-border mergers with an annual turnover 
of both businesses exceeding EUR 5,000 million worldwide and with 
EUR 250 million community turnover.84 However, to have a European 
dimension, the two-thirds rule can also play a role, as it is considered 
that such a dimension is lacking if each of the undertakings concerned 
achieved more than two-thirds of its EU-wide turnover in one Member 
State (Article 3).85 However, a procedure has been put in place in Article 
80 Ioannis Kokkoris and Howard Shelanski, EU Merger Control: An Economic and Legal Anal-
ysis (OUP 2014); Greg Olsen, ‘Revised EU Merger Remedy Guidance’ (2009) 23 Antitrust 
80; Lowe (n 26).
81 Edurne Navarro Varona, Merger Control in the European Union: Law, Economics and Prac-
tice (OUP 2005). 
82 Jay Modrall and others (n 24).
83 Slaughter and May, ‘The EU Merger Regulation: An Overview of the European Merger 
Control Rules’ (January 2018) 1 <www.slaughterandmay.com/media/64572/the-eu-merg-
er-regulation.pdf> accessed 28 August 2018.
84 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentra-
tions between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1, Article 2.
85 EC Merger Regulation (n 84) Article 3(a) and (b). Deals that do not meet the original 
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4(4) and (5) as a way of exception under which parties can engage in 
pre-notifi cation contacts with the authorities with a view to reallocating 
jurisdiction between the Commission and the NCAs to protect certain 
national interests.86 The Commission must mandatorily be notifi ed, and 
the merger cannot be implemented unless and until the Commission 
gives its clearance. The form to be fi lled in is included in the Implement-
ing Regulation.87 No mergers have been assessed by both regulators at 
the same time. This one-stop shop, as operated by EU mergers, will dis-
appear in the UK in the event of a full Brexit. 
With a full Brexit, this exclusive power to assess will no longer exist, 
meaning that mergers which meet both UK and EU thresholds will be 
subject to double scrutiny.88 This not only increases the risk of confl ict-
ing decisions but also substantially increases the costs and burden for 
companies.89 At the same time, it increases the workload of the CMA, 
which will have jurisdiction over much larger mergers than it did under 
EU law.90 Moreover, the argument that the UK would be able to better de-
fend its fi rms after Brexit is partially inaccurate. As the CLLS Competi-
tion Law Committee has noted, under the EU framework, the UK already 
has a ‘relatively broad scope’ to review public interest considerations, 
and Brexit will only provide opportunities to control mergers in a small 
number of cases that do not fall within the pre-defi ned categories, and 
where additional ‘legitimate interest’ is not accepted.91
If the UK becomes a member of the EEA following Brexit, the impli-
cations for competition policy regarding mergers will be minimal, while 
EU infl uence will remain visible because the main instrument on merg-
ers and markets, the Enterprise Act of 2002, was modelled on EU law. 
For companies, the option of a full Brexit would have disastrous 
effects. Indeed, nowadays, having a sound knowledge of the thresholds 
and intricacies of the merger control regime when dealing with complex 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions is of great importance. Merger re-
86 Slaughter and May (n 83).
87 Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 2004 
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gimes around the world have proliferated, adding a layer of complexity 
to international mergers and acquisitions. Most big merger and acqui-
sition transactions have a signifi cant cross-border dimension, meaning 
wide-ranging regulatory implications. Companies are obliged to notify 
competition authorities in multiple jurisdictions, including distant lo-
cations where neither the bidder nor the target market has operations 
but where the merger could have an effect, even if the merger occurs be-
tween two companies in the same country. For instance, the Boeing/Mc-
Donnell Douglas case,92 which was the fi rst case in which the European 
Union refused a merger, even though both companies were incorporated 
in the US, was refused on the grounds that such a merger would impair 
the international market.93 Consequently, in light of the Douglas case, it 
seems that a one-stop shop facilitates businesses’ operations. A single 
authority, aside from saving time and diminishing the cost burden of 
the requirement of clearance in every country where the parties operate, 
avoids companies constantly needing to check and deal with new merger 
fi ling regimes. The end of the ‘one-stop shop’ for mergers will mean that 
the work of the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority could increase 
sharply, which could weaken UK competition policy.94 Therefore, it would 
be important to maintain the ‘one-stop shop’ for merger control through 
an agreement, but this would depend on the willingness of both parties.
4 Conclusion 
There is much uncertainty as to the terms of the exit of the UK. The 
only certainty is that the fi nal date of exit will be in 2019. The full im-
pact of Brexit in the fi eld of competition will require more time to emerge. 
One immediate risk is the ineffi ciency through parallel investigations, 
which could lead to inconsistent outcomes but also increase the burden 
on businesses. EU competition case law is likely to remain highly infl u-
ential, at least in practice, because the two major pieces of legislation on 
competition, the Competition Act of 1998 and the Enterprise Act of 2002, 
have been modelled on EU competition law. Moreover, even before its 
accession to the EU, the UK had started to follow EU law. The exit of the 
UK is likely to force its authorities to set up a new parallel competition 
regime, at least in the long-run. 
92 Case No IV/M877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 
C(97) 2598 fi nal.
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The main rules on competition, namely the prohibitions on agree-
ments and abuse of dominant market positions, are unlikely to change, 
irrespective of the model adopted. Over the past two decades, interna-
tional convergence, both within Europe and globally, has increased, with 
many EU standards becoming global standards, which could result in 
the indirect infl uence of EU law on UK law. Consequently, the points of 
convergence between EU and UK policies would follow the broad consen-
sus on three crucial elements: the prevention of anti-competitive merg-
ers, the prevention of abuse of dominant positions, and anti-competitive 
agreements. However, views may differ as to what these terms imply. For 
instance, when looking at a merger, the CMA and the EU Commission 
will be looking at different geographical markets, leading to potential di-
vergent outcomes. The principal points of divergence will be the remedies 
provided in the case of mergers and the wider scope to apply non-com-
petition criteria to mergers. Finally, Article 60 of the Competition Act of 
1998 will need to be amended because it currently requires consistency 
with EU jurisprudence and would allow a non-UK court to determine the 
meaning of a domestic statute. 
The exit strategy which will have the greatest impact on UK compe-
tition policy is the withdrawal of the UK from the EU without applying 
for EEA membership.95 The UK will be freed from all treaty obligations 
and compliance with EU law. However, going down this road will mean 
that the UK loses some of its advantages and that Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU will still indirectly apply to conduct by UK businesses affecting the 
internal market. Thus, UK companies will remain subject to EU compe-
tition law, even if the UK adopts a new set of rules. The UK will no longer 
be bound by EU regulations, which raises questions about the EU Block 
Exemptions Regulation, whose advantages are widely accepted among 
practitioners and businesses. In the long-term, the UK position might 
deviate substantially from the EU approach, as the CMA has rarely in-
vestigated such restrictions. A hard Brexit would mean that UK com-
panies will no longer be able to be present in the internal market on a 
cross-border or branch basis and vice versa. 
In highly international and regulated sectors like aviation, Brex-
it means an enormous potential loss and harsher competition. In the 
short-term, UK competition law will still apply EU law as UK competition 
law, which is largely a copy of the key elements of the TFEU. Moreover, 
the case law in the UK has been infl uenced by EU law since it joined the 
EU. It remains to be seen whether the government, in the event of a full 
Brexit, would change these rules all at once or would only change the 
focus of the rules. Indeed, with UK courts no longer required to follow the 
95 Craig (n 10).
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decisions of European Courts, it will slowly lead to divergent interpreta-
tions between the two regimes. 
Another possibility is for the UK to agree to still observe EU law 
through a bilateral agreement with the EU, using the Swiss model. This 
model means that the UK would still comply with certain EU laws. This 
route would allow the UK to develop its own system of competition law 
without too many constraints from the EU.96 However, it is also an ex-
tremely complex route which would depend on the UK’s negotiating po-
sition. Moreover, it would increase bureaucratic and administrative ex-
penses, especially for certain branches, and could be subject to higher 
fl uctuations in foreign exchange rates, which would increase competition 
pressure. 
The fi nal alternative is that the UK will want to retain access to the 
internal market by becoming a member of the EEA. This would be the 
simplest option, although rejected by the Prime Minister in a speech in 
January 2017. This route might be simpler, but it is not straightforward. 
Indeed, to have EEA membership, the country must fi rst be part of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Under this alternative, the UK would 
remain under the obligation to apply EU competition law. The EEA Agree-
ment also contains similar prohibitions on the abuse of a dominant mar-
ket position. The courts of the members are also required to interpret 
EEA provisions in accordance with the decisions of the European courts.97 
The relationship between the CMA and the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
would be quasi-equivalent to the existing relationship between the CMA 
and the Commission. The main advantage of this option is that it allows 
the UK to retain the benefi ts fl owing from the one-stop shop for merger 
control. The Norway model might, however, be the best alternative, even 
with its downsides, and would turn the UK into a pure rule-taker.
Georgios Petropoulos noted that ‘if the UK leaves the EU without 
any agreement in place, this could change the way that competition law 
is applied. It could also make antitrust cases more costly and competi-
tion policy instruments less effective’.98 Indeed, the UK is regarded as 
having one of the most comprehensive competition frameworks and is 
infl uential on competition regimes around the world. By leaving the EU, 
the reputation of UK competition law might suffer. EU competition law 
will, in one way or another, still infl uence UK competition law, but the 
UK will lose its ability to infl uence EU competition law, to the detriment 
of its consumers. 
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